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THINKING GLOBALLY, POLICING LOCALLY. A MODEL FOR
DECENTRALIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COTE D'IVOIRE
Hugh M. Mundy*
INTRODUCTION
During a 2009 speech in Ghana, President Barack Obama said, "Africa doesn't need
strongmen. It needs strong institutions."' Obama credited Ghana's "impressive rates of
growth" to the country's "repeated peaceful transfers of power even in the wake of closely
contested elections." 2 Free elections and non-violent power transfers, he said, "may lack the
drama of the twentieth century's liberation struggles" but "will ultimately be more
significant." 3
C6te d'lvoire offers a stark example of the instability wrought when an unseated
leader refuses to cede power.4 Once hailed as a model of stability in Africa, the country has
devolved into turmoil over the last 15 years due to election-related violence. 5 In 2010, thenpresident Laurent Gbagbo resisted defeat after national elections, sparking a civil war during
which 3,000 civilians were killed. 6 Gbagbo was later charged with war crimes and is now
awaiting trial at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. His wife, Simone, was
convicted by the same court in March 2015 and sentenced to twenty years in prison for "her
part in the planned murders 'and other inhuman acts' orchestrated by the Gbagbo
administration.

Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. I would like to thank Adam Bolotin for his
editorial assistance, The John Marshall Law School for continued support of my scholarship, and my family.
' Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 11, 2009),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-ghanaian-parliament;
Philip
Gourevitch,
Coming
to
Terms,
THE
NEW
YORKER
(June
22,
2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/22/coming-to-terms-africas-succession-problem.
Gourevitch
discusses the history of entrenched regimes in several African countries, including Burkina Faso, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi. He describes Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan's
peaceful relinquishment of power following his recent electoral defeat as "the ultimate act of leadership." Id.
2 Remarks by the President to the GhanaianParliament,supra note 2.
Id.; Ron Elving, Could President Obama Win a Third Term?, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Jul. 29, 2015, 6:03 AM),
In
http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/07/29/427207032/could-president-obama-win-a-third-term.
July 2015, President Obama made similar remarks during a speech in Kenya as to the pre-election stalemate in
Burundi. Id. "When a leader tries to change the rules in the middle of the game," Obama said, "it risks
instability and strife." Id.
4 General
Information
on
Ivory
Coast,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/intemational/countriesandterritories/ivorycoast/index.html (last visited Oct.
26, 2015). The country's official name is Republic of C6te d'Ivoire. Id. In English-speaking countries, it is
often referred to as Ivory Coast. Id.
Africa: Ivory Coast Profile, BBC.COM (May 5, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa- 13287216.
6 Ivory
Coast Charges Ex-Rebels for Election
Violence, BBC.COM
(Jul.
8,
2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33440208..
Id.
See Marilia Brocchetto, Ivory Coast'sSimone Gbagbo Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison, CNN.coM (Mar. 10,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/10/africa/ivory-coast-first-lady/.
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Five years removed from the crisis, the country is still recovering.9 In post-election
riots, looters ransacked police stations requiring the military to assume control of law
enforcement. 0 In addition, the roads, power lines and water supplies in the most war-ravaged
communities were severely damaged." The fallout also reverberates within the current
presidential administration. In July 2015, twenty rebels backing the election's winner,
Alassane Ouattra, were charged with offenses stemming from the civil war. 12 The charges
signal that both parties - not just Gbagbo and his aggrieved supporters- shoulder blame for
the atrocities, leaving the country without a clear vision for its national governance.
Still, CMte d'Ivoire's prospects are "quite good," in large part due to steadfast
international support.1 4 The United States has played a central role in providing both financial
and humanitarian aid for Ivorian restoration efforts.15 On June 9, 2015, 1 received an
invitation from WorldChicago, a non-profit organization working with the U.S. Department
of State, to speak to a small delegation of officers from the Ivorian National Police. 16 The
parameters of the request were broad: to "present an overview of the United States system of
government, its decentralized nature, and the decision making process that flows from the
system."17 The officers were most interested in a discussion of "how federalism affects law
enforcement in the United States."' 8 Additionally, they sought an introduction to the
American law enforcement model "with the aim of potentially implementing American law
enforcement best practices into the Ivorian policing system."' 9

See
S.C.
Res.
2226
(June
25,
2015),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2226%28201/5%29.
'0 Nicolas Cook, C6te d7voire Post-Gbagbo: Crisis Recovery, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Apr. 20, 2011),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21989.pdf. Currently, the military continues to handle the bulk of local
policing duties. S.C. Res. 2226, supra note 10, T 9-10.
Adam Nossiter, Political Crisis in Ivory Coast Cripples a City, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/201 1/03/02/world/africa/02ivorycoast.html; Improving C6te D 'Ivoire 's Scarred
Public Services, JICA'S WORLD, 8 (Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/jworld/c8h0vm000091cwsc-att/1501_04.pdf [hereinafter JICA'S WORLD].
12 Ivory Coast Charges Ex-Rebelsfor Election Violence, supra note 7.
13 Id.
14 Pascal Yembiline, Bakary Traor6 & Luis Padilla, AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, COTE D'IVOIRE 2 (2014),
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_LongEN/Cote-divoireEN.pdf
; Cook, supra note 10, at 1.
9

5 U.S.

Relations

with

C6te

d7voire,

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

STATE

(Apr.

13,

2015),

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm. (The United States participates in the international effort to assist
Ivory Coast "providing more than a quarter of the funding for the U.N. Operations....").
6 According to its annual report, WorldChicago "facilitates professional and personal interactions for
international leaders during official visits to Chicago." 2014 WORLDCHICAGO ANN. REP. 1. In 2014, the
organization brought 68 groups of "accomplished young professionals" to Chicago through the U.S.
Department of State's International Visitor Leadership Program. Id.
'7 E-mail from Virginia Russell, Assoc. Dir., Centers for Intemational, Real Estate,
Tax & Employee Benefits,
The John Marshall Law Sch. to Hugh M. Mundy, Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law Sch.
(June 9, 2015, 18:29 EST) (on file with author).

1s Id.

19 E-mail from Chelsea Kendall, Program Coordinator, WorldChicago to Hugh M. Mundy, Assistant Professor
of Law, The John Marshall Law Sch., (June 16, 2015, 13:49 p.m. EST) (on file with author).
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The United States model of law enforcement is among the most decentralized in the
world.20 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held the Constitution contains "no
better example" of "what is truly local" than police power to suppress crime and vindicate
victims.21 The American system of "extreme" decentralization, however, has contributed to
multiple, overlapping and conflicting layers of law enforcement and investigation.22 Tracking
the various forces in the fragmented system is a "complicated endeavor," inhibiting oversight
and increasing bureaucracy at all levels.23 More troublingly, sporadic federal efforts to curb
police abuse and corruption at the local level have proven mostly fruitless.24 Over the past
eighteen months, the fatal police shootings of unarmed teenagers in Cleveland and Ferguson,
Missouri and the beating death of an arrestee in Baltimore have heightened calls for greater
federal monitoring of local police departments.25

20 SEBASTIAN ROCHE, GENEVA CTR. FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES, FEDERALISM
AND
POLICE SYSTEMS 18-19 (2011); LEONARD A. STEVERSON, POLICING IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK

99 (2008).
21 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599
(2000).
22 STEVERSON, supra note 20, at 99 ("The American system has federal, state, county and municipal
agencies
that often overlap by geographical jurisdiction . . . and this overlap routinely causes conflict of police law
enforcement and investigation."). In 2013, the Federal Bureau of Investigation survey reported over 900,000
full-time federal, state, and local law enforcement officers in the United States representing more than 13,000
agencies and departments. Full-time Law Enforcement Employees, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2013),
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table74/table_74_full time law enforcement employees bypopulation grouppercentmale andfemale_2013.xl
s; Police Employee Data, FED BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2013), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crimein-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/police-employee-data/police-employee-data. The report states "a total of
13,051 law enforcement agencies provided data on the number of full-time law enforcement employees." Id.
Notably, the wording of the report implies that the process was elective and the FBI relied on the agencies to
provide data without an independent mechanism to confirm the actual number of employees. Id.
STEVERSON, supra note 20, at 99 ("America has more separate police forces than any other nation in the
world. It is such a highly fragmented and decentralized system that even counting the number of individual
forces is problematic"); Chuck Canterbury, The Future of Law Enforcement in America, NAT'L FRATERNAL
ORDER OF POLICE (2010) ("We have a vast range of law enforcement agencies at every level of government.
There is not even a consensus as to how many police agencies exist in the United States."),
http://www.fop.net/labor/icpra/3TheFutureofLawEnforcementintheUnitedStatesofAmerica.pdf.
24 Kami Chavis Simmons, CooperativeFederalism and Police Reform: Using CongressionalSpending Power
2

to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 375 (2013) ("Since the enactment of [federal
legislation designed to increase police accountability] in 1994, the [U.S. Department of Justice] has conducted
33 investigations, only seven of which resulted in a consent decree filed in federal court. Many of the initial
investigations that culminated in a negotiated agreement were in smaller cities, while major urban areas seemed
to avoid [enforcement]."); Kim D. Chanbonpin, Truth Stories: Credibility Determinations at the Illinois

Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1085, 1087 (2014) (documenting "[r]evelations of
corruption, abuse, and misconduct by police and other law enforcement officers through the country," including

in New York, Los Angeles, and New Orleans.) In Chicago, Commander Jon Burge and Chicago Police
Department (CPD) officers working under him tortured African- American suspects to extract confessions for
over a decade until Burge's termination in 1993. Id. A federal investigation led to Burge's 2010 conviction for
offenses related to the torture. Id.
25 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 25, at 390-91 (proposing an amendment to federal law mandating that

"receipt of federal money related to training and hiring police officers" by state and local law enforcement
agencies "should be given only with the assurance that agencies will set "minimum standards for police
accountability."); Eugene Robinson, What America's Police Departments Don't Want You to Know, WASH.
POST (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/eugene-robinson-its-a-crime-that-we-dont-

know-how-many-people-police-shoot-to-death/2014/12/0 1/adedcb00-7998-1 le4-b821
503cc7efed9e_story.html (calling for stricter and more comprehensive federal accounting of police shootings
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Additionally, longstanding domestic crime control strategies, epitomized by the
thirty-plus year War on Drugs, bear little resemblance to law enforcement "best practices."
Rather, the approach has led to bloated prisons and budgetary crises, while doing little to
26
strengthen communities or prevent recidivism. Only recently has a serious movement begun
27
to backtrack from the failed strategies. The movement signals an emerging consensus that
the "best practices" of law enforcement are not directed towards arrest and incarceration rates,
but towards pro-active strategies to address conditions that contribute to public safety
issues.28 Broadly stated, these strategies embody the tenets of "community policing." 2 9
C6te d'lvoire's government structure and socio-political realities cast doubt on the
viability of adopting a highly decentralized law enforcement system. Additionally, costintensive and disproportionately punitive crime control methods like the ones historically
employed in the United States are similarly inefficacious. As this article will propose, a
modified approach to decentralized policing - one that includes a modicum of central
government oversight, invests in a manageable and empowered local police force, and builds
trust within the community - may be most effective in C6te d'Ivoire. Part I will provide a
brief history of C6te d'lvoire with a focus on the aftermath of the 2010 election. Part 11 will
discuss the benefits and challenges of decentralization and explain core principles for
implementation of an effective decentralized law enforcement system. Part III will highlight
the efficacy of community policing as contrasted with prevailing U.S. criminal control
strategies. Finally, Part IV will propose a partially decentralized model of law enforcement
for C6te d'Ivoire, with an emphasis on community policing.C6te d'Ivoire: A Disputed
Election and a Daunting Recoveryo
C6te d'Ivoire claimed independence from France in 1960 and enjoyed relative
stability in the thirty years that followed.' Unlike the Marxist leanings of nearby regimes, the
country's first president, F61ix Houphoudt-Boigny, espoused the political and economic
philosophies of the West.32 In addition, Houphou~t-Boigny displayed a deft touch at forging
compromise - if not trust - among C6te d'Ivoire's multitude of religious and ethnic
factions.

that requires "[all law enforcement agencies to report all uses of deadly force to the [Federal Bureau of
Investigation], using a standardized format that allows comparisons and analysis.").
26 Jennifer Steinhauser, Bipartisan Push Builds
to Relax Sentencing Laws, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/us/push-to-scale-back-sentencing-laws-gainsmomentum.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region&region=topnews&AWT.nav--top-news.
27 Id.

28 NICOLE FORTIER & IMANI CHETTIAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y.
U. SCH. OF LAW, SUCCESSORIENTED FUNDING: REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE GRANTS 1, 3 (2015).

Tracey L. Meares, Prayingfor Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1600 (2002) ("Community
policing, regardless of its specific scholarly definition, stands in direct contrast to reform policing.")
30 C6te d'lvoire is located in Western Africa. The country neighbors Liberia to the west and Ghana to the
east.
Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso surround the northern border. To the south lies the Atlantic Ocean. Ivory Coast
Profile,supra note 6, at 1. The country's population is approximately 22 million. Id.
31 Xan Rice, Ivory Coast's Turbulent Recent History, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 6, 2011, 1:51 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/201 I/apr/06/ivory-coast-history.
32 id.
29

33

Id.
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After Houphou&t-Boigny's death in 1993, the divide between the country's
Christian south and Muslim north deepened.3 4 The new president, Henri Konan B~die,
ushered in an era of xenophobia, encouraging "Ivority" and marginalizing immigrant
populations. 3 ' B6di&'s may have been less nationalistic than political in motivation; the father
of his chief rival, Alassane Ouattara, hailed from neighboring Burkina Faso. Regardless, his
37
stance further imbalanced C6te d'Ivoire's fragile social equilibrium.
In 1999, soldiers led by General Robert Guel toppled B6di6 in a bloodless coup and
38
established military rule. The coup proved the harvest of seeds sown by B6di&'s pursuit of
shortsighted political aspirations. Worse still, it moved C6te d'lvoire into turbulence which
resonates today. Without effective central governance, the country became pockmarked with
localized violence. 3 9 After a year of ineffectual military rule, Laurent Gbagbo challenged
Gu&6 in a free, if controversial, election. 4 0 With polling indicating that Gbago held a decisive
lead, Gu& "cried fraud" and asserted himself the victor. 4 1 Gu6Y's self-proclaimed victory was
42
short-lived. He was overthrown in a coup and Gbagbo rose to power.
Given its origins, Gbagbo's tenure was predictably contentious. In 2002, insurgents
attempted a coup, which, though unsuccessful, split the country into a "government-run
south" and a rebel-held north. 43 The fracture sparked the bloodiest decade in the country's
history, a period during which thousands were killed. 4 Over the next eighteen months, the
government and the so-called "New Forces" rebels attempted to broker a series of ceasefire
agreements, none of which took hold.4 5
In 2004, United Nations peacekeeping forces intervened in an effort to quell the
46
escalating violence. The U.N. resolution authorizing action expressed "deep concern" over
the deteriorating economic conditions and the "threat to international peace and security in the
region." 4 7 The peacekeeping forces provided a measure of stability, though spasms of

34 Id.
3

Id.

36Id.

n Rice, supra note 31.
39 See Cook, supra note 10.

Rice, supra note 31, at 1. Gbagbo was no stranger to political controversy. After receiving a Ph.D. in history
from Paris Dierdot University, he returned to C6te d'Ivoire and became one of the few outspoken critics of
Houphouet-Boigny. Sam Sanders, Ivory Coast Conflict: Who are Gbagbo and Ouattara?, WASH. POsT (Apr. 1,
2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/post/ivory-coast-conflict-who-are-gbagbo-andouattara/2011/04/01/AFpbqvJC blog.html. He was imprisoned in the early 1970s for "subversive" teaching and
spent six years in French exile in the 1980s after publishing a series of anti-government writings. Id. He
returned to form the Ivorian Popular Front. Against Gu&i, Gbagbo campaigned as an alternative to the political
establishment and drew widespread public support for his candidacy. Id.
41 Rice, supra note 31, at 1.
42 Id.
43 Id.; Africa: Ivory CoastProfile, supra note 5.
4 Ivory
Coast
Timeline,
NBCNEWS.COM,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42376906/t/ivory-coasttimeline/#.VaZ40ektAqM (last visited Oct. 27, 2015).
45 Africa: Ivory Coast Profile, supra note 5.
46 S.C.
Res.
1528
(Feb.
27,
2004),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1 528%20%282004%29.
40

47 Id.
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48

violence continued to erupt throughout the country. The northern and southern factions
officially reunited in 2007.49 The accord, however, was generally viewed as a pyrrhic victory
for the nation. 50
By 2010, Gbagbo's "political maneuvering" and thinly-veiled election
5
postponements had extended his legal term in office by a half-decade. In the hopes that a
popular election would advance the peace process, the U.N. certified a contest between
52
Gbagbo and Ouattara, B6di6's former rival. The candidates stood in sharp geographical,
ideological and religious contrast, setting the stage for tension in the electorate. The
challenger Ouattara, a former International Monetary Fund official, represented the interests
of the Muslim North.5 3 Gbagbo, a practicing Christian, enjoyed support from southern C6te
d'lvoire (and, perhaps unsurprisingly, from a number of prominent conservatives in the
United States).5 4
Far from uniting the C6te d'lvoire, the election plunged the country deeper into
chaos. 5 Gbagbo and Ouattara both claimed victory following a disputed vote count, setting
off sectarian violence.5 6 In the country's commercial capital of Abidjan, Gbagbo wrapped
himself in the Ivorian flag and took an oath for another term in office. 5 7 Within hours,
Ouattara reported from the northern stronghold of Bouake that he had taken the same oath.

48 The bloodiest engagements included a 2004 attack on rebel forces during which nine French soldiers were

killed. France responded with air attacks that destroyed C6te d'Ivoire's small air force. Africa: Ivory Coast
Profile, supra note 5. Sectarian violence and orchestrated attempts to unseat Gbagbo persisted in the years prior
to the controversial 2010 election. Id.; see, e.g., THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Ivory Coast: Army Says It Foiled a

Coup,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Dec.

13,

2006),

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/13/world/africa/13briefs-

ivorycoastcoup.html?_r-0\ (reporting on an alleged plot to "assassinat[e] political authorities and military

leaders, notably the president of the republic and the army chief of staff.").
49 Rice, supra note 31.
so Monica

Mark,

Ivory

Coast's

Disputed

Presidential Election,

TIME.COM

(Dec.

6,

2010),

2,

2010),

http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2035342,00.html.
51 Adam Nossiter, Election Results Challenged in
www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/world/africa/03ivory.html.
52 See generally Cook, supra note 10.

Ivory

Coast, N.Y.

TIMES

(Dec.

5 Sanders, supra note 40; see also Rice, supra note 31 at 1; Africa: Ivory Coast Profile, supra note 5; U.N.
OPERATION IN COTE D'IVOIRE, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/ (last visited Oct. 27,2015).

Though he never previously held elected office, Outtara's political aspirations dated back to B6dib's
presidency. Ouattara, whose father hailed from Burkina Faso, was the rival who provoked B6die's antiimmigrant stance. Id. After the pro-B6di6 General Assembly passed a law forbidding candidates with foreignborn parents from seeking national office, Ouattara provided documentation claiming that both of his parents

were born in Ivory Coast. Id. He was accused of forgery, but was eventually cleared to run against Gbagbo. Id.
54 Mark Oppenheimer, A Strongman Found Support in Prominent U.S. Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11,

2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/1 l/us/12evangelical.html?_r-O.
5

Nossiter, supra note 51.

56 Id. ("A historic presidential election intended to unify this long-divided nation slipped further into
uncertainty ... as a heated tug of war emerged over who had the power to proclaim a winner."); Mediators Try
to
Intervene
in
Ivory
Coast
Chaos,
U.S.
TODAY
(Dec.
5,
2010,
11:42
AM),

http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-12-05-ivory-coast-electionN.htm.
5

See Mediators Try to Intervene in Ivory Coast Chaos, supra note 56. But see Mark, supra note 51 (reporting

that a climactic moment in the dispute occurred "[w]hen an electoral-commission spokesperson . . . prepared to
read partial results [declaring Ouattara the victor], a pro-Gbagbo representative tore the papers from his hand
and crumpled them.").
ss Mediators Try to Intervene in Ivory Coast Chaos, supra note 56.
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The "normally timid" United Nations, perhaps chastened by its failure to engender
harmony through the election, declared Ouattara the winner. 9 Gbagbo remained defiant,
going so far as to give a nationally televised inauguration speech.60 The speech was replayed
continuously on Radiodiffision T616vision Ivorienne (RTI), the state-run television network."
At the same time, Gbagbo suppressed media reports of Ouattara's victory and accused the
U.N. of "meddling" in its sovereign affairs. 6 2 In a particularly bloody confrontation, soldiers
opened fire on a crowd of Ouattara supporters who attempted a takeover of RTI in the midst
63
of the stridently pro-Gbagbo broadcasts. An estimated twenty demonstrators were killed and
6
several others injured.
Gbagbo's willingness to use deadly force against his own countrymen presaged a
period of unprecedented violence in C6te d'Ivoire.6 ' By early 2011, Abidjan "once famed for
its Parisian-style boulevards, glass-clad skyscrapers and fashionable shops," sat on the
precipice of ruin. 6 6 Heavily-armed crime squads threatened journalists who attempted to
report on the city's rapid decline.6 Marauding gangs of rock-wielding Gbagbo loyalists set up
roadblocks to prevent entry into the capital.68 International sanctions crippled the country's
69
economy.
As the central infrastructure crumbled, Ouattara remained barricaded in a
dilapidated hotel that doubled as a makeshift presidential headquarters.7 0 Rebel forces
fortified the grounds surrounding the hotel, creating a tense standoff with soldiers positioned
behind improvised barriers. 7 ' Although Abidjan remained the epicenter of the conflict,
violence spread throughout the country "signal[ing] that a new Ivorian civil war was under
way." 72 Local factions clashed, with sides drawn based on presumed ethnic or religious
74
affiliation. 7 ' Looting, rioting, and gang warfare became commonplace.
In March 2011, the New Forces, with U.N. and French backing, initiated a sustained
attack on Abidjan. The siege provided the conflict's climactic - and deadliest - chapter. 6

s' Mark, supra note 50.
60 Id
61 Id.; see also Cook, supra note 10, at 24, 85 (explaining RTI is the state-run television network.).

62 Mark, supra note 50.
13 Cook, supra note 10, at 24.
6 Id. at 24.
65 Ivory Coast Timeline, supra note 45. Gbagbo's brutality against civilians was especially stark. On March 3,
2011, his forces opened fire on a group of unarmed female demonstrators, killing seven. Id. Later in the month,
Gbagbo's forces were blamed for an attack in Abidjan that claimed 25 lives. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Ivory Coast:
Attack
on
Market
May
Be
War
Crime,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Mar.
18,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/africa/19briefs-ART-Ivorycoast.html.
66 Mark, supra note 50.
67 PoliticalCrisis in Ivory Coast Cripples a City, supra note 1 1.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Adam Nossiter,

Ivory Coast Leader's Rival Remains Under Blockade, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2011),

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/world/africa/06ivory.html.
71

Id.

72 Cook, supra note 10, at 28.
" Id. at 26.
74 Id. at 28.

7s Adam Nossiter, Hundreds of Thousands Flee Ivory Coast, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/world/africa/26ivory-coast.html
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"Fueled by fears of all-out war," hundreds of thousands of civilians fled from Abidjan to
neighboring cities. 7 1 On April 11, 2011, rebels stormed Gbagbo's residence and arrested
him.7 Adam Nossiter of The New York Times described Gbagbo's surrender as the end of "a
four-month standoff that left hundreds dead in this once-prosperous West African nation, put
international diplomacy to a severe test and ultimately dragged the country back into civil
war." 7 9 Currently, Gbagbo awaits trial in The Hague.so Ouattara remains the country's
president. An election.is slated for October 2015.
Even after the prolonged civil war, C6te d'lvoire has the second largest economy in
82
West Africa. As its economic backbone, the country is a leading exporter of cocoa and
83
cashew nuts. According to the World Bank, the Ouattara administration has engineered
"substantial progress" towards renewed economic stability. 8 4 C6te d'lvoire has enjoyed
double-digit growth rates in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over the last three years.
Inflation rates over the same period have remained a modest 2.5%.86 The economic growth
and low inflation stand in sharp contrast to the same indicators following the post-election
chaos.87 The rapid upswing and potential for continued ascension has transformed the wartorn country into "a new darling of frontier investors."
Additionally, C6te d'Ivoire held a nationwide election in April 2013 designed to
form governments at regional and municipal levels. 89 Though marred by isolated violence, the

Ivory Coast]; Adam Nossiter, Strikes by U.N. and French CornerLeader of Ivory Coast, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/world/africa/05ivory.html.
76 Nearly 500 people died in the days culminating with Gbagbo's arrest, bringing the post-election
death toll to
approximately 3,000. Matt Wells, C6te dIvoire: Dispatches - a Look At Human Rights in the News Today,
2013),
13,
(July
WATCH
GENOCIDE
http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Cote_dIvoire2013_07_31 _UN_presses countryto-examine war cn
mesduringpost electionperiod.pdf; see also U.N. Official: Ivory Coast Death Toll Up to 462, VOICE OF
AMERICA (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/content/un-official-ivory-coast-death-toll-up-to-462118580879/136988.html. In addition to the casualties, "as many as I million refugees" fled the country during
the conflict. Sanders, supra note 40.
n Hundreds of Thousands Flee Ivory Coast, supra note 75.
7 Adam Nossiter, Scott Sayere & Dan Bilefsky, Leader's Arrest in Ivory Coast Ends Standoff N.Y. TIMES,
(Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/world/africa/12ivory.html.
7 Id.
'o The charges against Gbagbo involve his sanctioning of "widespread and systematic" use of deadly force
against unarmed civilian demonstrators. Adam Nossiter, Arrest Warrant Issued for Wife of Ivory Coast
President, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/23/world/africa/criminal-courtissues-arrest-warrant-for-simone-gbagbo.html.
8' John Mukum Mbaku, THE BROOKING INST. AFRICA GROWTH INITIATIVE, AFRICAN ELECTIONS IN 2015: A
SNAPSHOT
FOR
C)TE
D'IVOIRE,
TANZANIA,
BURKINA
FASO,
AND
SUDAN
52 (2015),
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Research/Files/Reports/2015/01/foresight/o20africa/african%20elections%
20mbaku%20FINAL.pdf.
82 Ivory Coast Overview, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cotedivoire/overview.
83
84

Id.
Id.

8s The country's GDP growth rate was 10.7% in 2012, 8.7% in 2013, and between 9 and 10% in 2014. Id.
86

Id.

" Id. In 2011, GDP growth rate was in "steep decline" at -4.7%. Id.
88

Joe Bavier, Gunmen Kill Two Soldiers in Attack on Ivory CoastBorder Town, REUTERS.COM (Jan. 10, 2015,

9:31 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/10/us-ivorycoast-attacks-idUSKBNOKJOEY20150110.
89 A.R.,
The Calm and the Storm, THE ECONOMIST (Apr.
26, 2013, 4:22 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2013/04/c-te-d-ivoire.
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election established local governance for the ongoing restoration of public services. 90 Still, the
World Bank cites the need for structural reforms needed to sustain growth, including
improving local governance in the most vulnerable communities. 9 ' Poverty has risen over the
last fifteen years and remains high, especially in rural areas. 9 2 More problematically, there is
evidence that C6te d'Ivoire has not learned from "old mistakes" vis-d-vis corruption within
the presidential administration. 9 3 In the lead-up to the charges against several key Ouattara
allies, the central government was widely accused of engaging in "victor's justice" by
shielding its supporters from prosecution. 9 4 Public confidence in the administration remains
tepid.95
The U.N. and international community continue to provide support to C6te
d'lvoire. A June 22, 2015 U.N. Resolution "welcomes the progress being made towards
reconciliation" but states that the country "bears primary responsibility for ensuring peace,
stability and the protection of [its] civilians."9 The Resolution encourages the nation to
"further strengthen the rule of law." 9 8 Additionally, it calls for "prioritizing efforts to
implement completely [a] security sector reform strategy, with a special attention to the
training and equipment of the police." 99 Such training, the Resolution highlights, must be
"accelerated" and geared towards restoring police performance of "public order tasks
currently performed by the army."' 00 In light of the country's tenuous infrastructure, the
doubts undermining the Ouattara administration, and the nation's embedded ethic and
religious divisions, the task of adequately training and sustaining a viable police force on any
timetable is formidable. To expedite and enhance the process, the systems of law enforcement
used in other countries - including the United States - present options for implementation.

9 JICA'S WORLD, supra note I1, at 8; Yembiline, Traor6, & Padilla,supra note 14, at 9.
91 Ivory Coast Overview, supra note 82 (noting that Ivory Coast has made halting progress in improving social
services and creating jobs in the areas most affected by the civil war.).
92 Ivory Coast Overview, supra note 82 (stating that the poverty level rose from 36% in 1998 to 50% in 2008,
largely due to "the succession of multifaceted crises that the country has experienced since the beginning of the
decade.").
1
Adam Nossiter, In Troubled States, New Government With the Same Old Problems, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/world/africa/in-troubled-states-new-govemments-with-the-sameold-problems.html (describing the Ouattara administration as "stuffed with patronage appointments and
relatives of leaders.").
94 THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Ivory Coast President'sAllies Charged Over Election Dispute, N.Y TIMES (July
I1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/07/11I/world/africa/ap-af-ivory-coast-justice.html.
' Mbaku, supra note 82, at 52; OVERSEAS SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COTE D'IVOIRE
2015
CRIME
AND
SAFETY
REPORT
(Jan.
29,
2015),
https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportPDF.aspx?cid=17008 [hereinafter 2015 CRIME AND SAFETY
REPORT] ("The government has made economic and commercial development its top priority and has achieved
significant growth rates in 2013 and 2014. Nonetheless, the average tvoirian has not yet benefited from this
growth and renewed investor confidence in the economy.").
9 S.C. Res. 2226, supra note 9, 16; U.S. Relations with C6te d Ivoire, supra note 15.
9
S.C. Res. 2226, supra note 9. As evidence that violence persists, the Resolution condemned two attacks in
January 2015 along the border with Liberia, believed to have been carried out by Gbagbo loyalists. Id.
9 Id.
' Id. at 2.
'" Id. at 5.
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I. DECENTRALIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT: BENEFITS, CHALLENGES AND
OUTCOMES
Decentralization refers to the redistribution of power from a central authority to
regional and local authorities.' 0 ' Commonly, decentralization results in the allocation of
power or division of responsibility between multiple layers of government.102 The delegation
of power typically breaks down along geographical boundaries over which local governments
exercise authority and perform public functions. o3 Programmatically, decentralization may
target a discreet component of government - such as public education, policing, or health care
- or address multiple, overlapping components.'" To be sure, strategies for decentralization
must be tailored both to the specific entity at issue and the type of delegation taking place. 05
Further, the goals of decentralization matter. In some cases, the objectives are purely
pragmatic: to curtail bureaucracy, streamline processes, or promote efficiency.' 06 For
instance, in East Asia, the pressing need to improve service delivery to an ever-escalating
population has hastened decentralization.'" In other cases, the chief aim of decentralization is
community empowerment. That is, if a community is entrusted to determine its own affairs
through local governance, its residents will feel secure, independent, and self-directed.'" To
this end, decentralization "speaks to the aspirations of people and communities who simply
09
want government to be closer and more attentive to their needs."
At their best, decentralized systems facilitate opportunities for residents to
participate in community life and to monitor government functions." 0 In turn, leaders, keenly

RocHI, supra note 20, at 8 (explaining decentralization and federalism are related, but distinct, concepts.
Federalism is a system in which the power to govern is shared between national and provinicial/state
governments, usually as defined in a constitution. Decentralization is a more flexible arrangement and "can
typically be revoked by the central [government].").
102 Decentralizationand Subnational Regional Economics: What, Why, and Where, THE WORLD BANK GRP.,
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/what.htm (last visited, Oct. 28, 2015) [hereinafter
THE WORLD BANK GRP.] (describing decentralization as a full or partial "transfer of authority and
10o

responsibility for public functions . .. to local governments.").
103 ROCHE, supra note 20, at 13.
1 THE WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 102; Cheryl Saunders, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
OPTIONS
FOR
DECENTRALIZING
POWER:
FEDERALISM
To
DECENTRALIZATION
I
(2006),
http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/files/federalism.pdf ("There is almost an infinite variety of

decentralized agreements.").
1os THE WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 102; ROCHE, supra note 20, at 12 ("Decentralization ranges from de-

concentration - its weakest form characterized by the existence of a local representative of the central state - to
devolution - in its stronger form, powers are allotted to the local level").
106 THE WORLD BANK GRP., supranote 102.
1o7 Id.
1os Larry Diamond,

Why

Decentralize Power in a Democracy?, Conference

on Fiscal

& Admin.

Decentralization (Feb. 12, 2004), https://web.stanford.edu/-diamond/iraq/DecentralizePower021204.htm.
109 Id.; see also Saunders, supra note 104, at 2 ("Decentralization aims to distribute public power broadly so as
to achieve more effective and responsive government, to broaden access to government services and economic

resources, to encourage greater public participation in government, to provide a basis on which often diverse
groups can live together peacefully, and to underpin the stability of the state, by persuading groups to remain
within it.").
"o Diamond, supra note 108, at 3; see also ROCHE, supra note 20, at II ("Political decentralization assumes
that decisions made with greater participation will be better informed and more relevant to diverse interests in

society than those made only by national political authorities.").
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aware of the close watch of the community, are motivated to make decisions that reflect the
good of the people."' To function effectively, there must be both a "credible incentive" for
residents to become engaged and a system for accountability of local officials. 112 Resident
engagement relies, in large part, upon trust in the commitment of leadership to pursue the
public good and to manage efficiently."' Accountability is measured both by the transparency
of the system and the existence of a sanctioned set of rules, processes and procedures for
inviting public feedback.'1 4 While a community may at first measure decentralization
favorably against the intransigencies of central government, lasting public support relies on
mechanisms for meaningful participation. "Moreover, effective decentralization requires a
levelling of the traditional "top down" bureaucratic paradigm. 1'6 This shift is particularly
critical in countries with scant history of local governance; the tendency being toward
domination by an "all-powerful mayor with no meaningful role for the elected local
council."" 7
To the contrary, "high functioning" decentralized governance emphasizes
collaborative decision-making among multiple representatives - or between representatives
and community members. "8 This approach has myriad benefits, both tangible and
intangible." 9 In the context of policing, a collaborative model discourages compartmentalized
responses to community ills - or "fragmented silos or stove-pipes, with each department or
unit working alongside one another." 2 0 Instead, the model prizes cross-sectional
collaboration in which multiple departments work together to address complex, intertwined
issues. 121
Though decentralization disburses power to the local level, the creation of a network
of self-sufficient independent local authorities can forge national stability and unity.122 This

" Diamond, supra note 108.
112 THE WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 102.
" Ronald W. Johnson & Henry P. Minnis, Jr., RESEARCH TRIANGLE INST., TOWARD DEMOCRATIC
DECENTRALIZATION:
APPROACHES
TO
PROMOTING
GOOD
GOVERNANCE
9 - (1996),
https://rti.org/pubs/Toward-demodecen.pdf (providing a framework for more responsive and accountable
democratic systems in developing countries, especially those with a history of "abuses of authoritarian

regimes.").
114 Id. at 2.
1' Id.
116 Deborah Kimble, Jamie Boex & Gina Kapitinova, URBAN INST. CTR. ON INT'L DEV. & GOVERNANCE,
MAKING DECENTRALIZATION WORK IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: TRANSFORMING LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ENTITIES
INTO
HIGH-PERFORMING
LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
1
(2012),
http://w ww.urban.org/research/publication/making-decentralization-work-developing-countries-transforming-

local-government/view/full report.

' Id. at 3.
"1 Id. at 4.

"9 See generally id. (explaining the benefits of decentralized governance.).
20 Id. at 3.
121 Id. at 3-4; see also Saunders, supra note 104, at 4 ("Mechanisms to encourage unity and co-operation
balance mechanisms for autonomy in all decentralized systems and are particularly important in states with

deep social divisions.").
122 THE WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 102; see also Saunders, supra note 104, at 5 (Decentralization gives
minority groups "a sense of ownership of the state as a whole . . . [and] provides the means through which

political leaders of minority groups can play a formally recognized leadership role, thus providing them with
the incentive to work constructively within the state.").
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notion is especially true in countries with diverse ethnic and religious populations.12 Lower
levels of office offer an entry point for the recruitment, training and development of new
leaders who may be historically underrepresented in national government, especially women
and minorities.124 In addition, through decentralization, local entities may devise programs
and processes that best fit the particular needs of the community.125 More broadly,
decentralization promotes a "best practices" ethos in which regional programs may become
6
national models.1 2
Several African countries exemplify decentralization as a means to spur increased
participation in the political process. 127 In Ethiopia, pressure from regional and ethnic groups
seeking a stronger voice in national decision-making resulted in the decentralization of
government services and programs.128 A "variation on this theme" involves countries, like
C~te d'lvoire, affected by civil wars that destabilized the central government or split the
country into warring factions. 129 In this scenario, decentralization provides a certain
therapeutic effect as disparate sides may play a role in restoring order at the local level.130
Moreover, an increasing number of studies indicate that decentralized local leadership can
play an important role in a post-conflict environment in improving governance and boosting
public safety. "3
1. The Challenges of Decentralization
Decentralization also presents certain obstacles. 13 Untethered from federal
oversight, local governments are at risk of becoming "fiefdoms" dominated by political

123 Saunders, supra note 104, at 5.
124 Id. Importantly, the most recent U.N. Resolution for Ivory Coast "[reiterated] the vital role of women in

conflict resolution and peace-building, the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all
efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and their key role in re-establishing the fabric
of societies recovering from conflict[.]" S.C. Res. 2226, supranote 9.
125 Saunders, supra note 104, at 5. The World Bank describes this potential for shared political and economic
benefits. Decentralization can "increase political responsiveness and participation at the local level" while

advancing "the economic objectives of better decisions about the use" and methods of distribution of services.
THE WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 102.
126 See Saunders, supra note 104, at 5 ("Decentralization necessarily involves some diversity in rules,

standards and procedures across the country" but "because all belong to a single state, the stability of which is
important, they must all work collaboratively, within a framework that serves the needs of the people of the
state as a whole.").
127 THE WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 102.
128 Id. at 3.
129 Id. (citing Uganda and Mozambique as examples of post-civil war nations in which decentralization
has
created "political opportunities at the local levels [and] allowed for greater participation by all former warring

factions in the governance of the country.").
130 id.
'13 JAMIE BOEX, DEBORAH KIMBLE & JULIANA PIGEY, URBAN INST. CTR. ON INT'L DEV. & GOVERNANCE,
DECENTRALIZED LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS A MODALITY FOR POST-CONFLICT RECOVERY AND
DEVELOPMENT:
AN
EMERGING NATURAL
EXPERIMENT
IN
NORTHERN
UGANDA
1
(2010),

http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412217-Decentralized-local-govemments-asa-modality-for-post-conflict-recovery-and-development-An-emerging-natural-experiment-in-Nothem-

Uganda.PDF.
132 THE WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 103 ("[Decentralization is not a panacea, and it does have potential

disadvantages.").
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bosses and poisoned by corruption, intimidation, and self-interest. "3 The results may be
disastrous, especially for countries emerging from civil war and susceptible to splintering into
a loose collection of one-party strongholds.' 34 A 2011 Urban Institute report on
decentralization in developing countries describes this phenomenon aptly: "The fundamental
nature of the public sector does not change through decentralization if the 'big man' at the top
of the central government pyramid is merely supplemented by smaller 'big men' at the top of
each local government pyramid." 3 5
Decentralized police forces may become similarly disfigured, mutating from entities
designed to protect citizens to ones prone to abuse them - especially religious, ethnic or other
minorities. Even in countries with strong federal governments, like the United States, police
corruption at the local level has proved insidious and pervasive.' 3 6 To thwart these
eventualities, decentralization need not constitute an "all or nothing" proposition. 131 Its
implementation may be partial or incremental, with the federal government retaining certain
powers or ceding jurisdictional control over a period of time. "' Such arrangements reflect a
39
kind of "cooperative federalism" or "cooperative decentralization."
An additional challenge of decentralization involves the incapacity of local entities
to take on central government responsibilities. 14 This obstacle is acute in C6te d'Ivoire. 141
Almost five years since the war's apex, public services remain inadequate. 142 While the April
2013 elections created regional and local governments to manage public services, the process
has suffered from funding shortages, ill-trained officials, and communication lapses. 143
Nonetheless, reasons for hope exist.144 Unlike other countries in which infighting
toppled the central government, the Ivorian government is intact and solvent.1 4 5 Though

133 Diamond, supra note 108; see also Saunders, supra note 104, at 6 (The process
of decentralization may be
complicated "by self-interest on the part of political leaders. Effective decentralization requires commitment by
leaders at each level of government.").
134 Diamond, supranote 108.
135 KIMBLE, BOEX & KAPITINOVA,supra, note 116 at 1.

36 Chanbonpin, supra note 24, at 1088.

n THE WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 102; See also Saunders, supra note 104, at 6 (noting the challenge of
balancing the amount of power and decision-making authority between the central government and the
decentralized system.).
1 THE WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 102 ("Even when national governments decentralize responsibilities,
they often retain important policy and supervisory roles. They must create or maintain the 'enabling conditions'
that allow local units of administration or non-government organizations to take on more responsibilities."); see
also Saunders, supra note 104, at I (stating decentralization may entail delegation "in which the [center] retains
authority to withdraw the delegated power or to direct its use.").
Roche, supra note 20, at 9, 15. "Cooperative federalism," a term coined in the United States in the 1930s,
emphasizes that there are many areas where federal and state responsibilities overlap and encourages a
workable division of resources. Id.
'39

140 Saunders, supra note 104, at 7,8.
41 Id. at 8 ("The challenge of capacity may be particularly severe where decentralization takes place as a
response to armed conflict, especially where the state has effectively collapsed.").
I4 JICA'S WORLD, supra note I1, at 8 (reporting that "[t]he lack of govemment services due to the war has left
55% of Ivorian water supply facilities in nonworking order.").
143 Id.; Saunders, supra note 104, at 8 (A challenge to decentralization is "adequately inform[ing], involv[ing]

and engag[ing] the people.").
1 Ivory Coast Overview, supra note 82 (stating that Ivory Coast has made "great leaps in development since

2011" and "has great economic potential" in the coming years).
145 Id.; Cook, supra note 10, at 6-7.
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weakened by the presidential election fallout, the government remains capable of funding,
training, and the "phased transfer" of responsibilities to local authorities. 146 At the same time,
there is broad international backing for decentralization. 147 The United States, Japan, France
and other nations have provided funding, support, and consultation to facilitate the process.148
International urging aside, decentralization is in the country's best long-term
national interest. 149 The considerable undertaking of restoring utility lines, water supply, and
other basic services demands manpower at the local level. so The same holds true in law
enforcement, especially when police stations must be rebuilt from the ground up.'' While
military control of police powers made sense in the aftermath of the disputed election,
continued policing by the national army is a costly, cumbersome and ineffective stopgap.152
2. Making Decentralization Work: An Essential Checklist for Law Enforcements3
Amid transition in Nepal from a centralized governmental system to a federal
republic, a 2011 report by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
assessed "the readiness and ability of the Nepalese police force to engage readily in the
federalization process." 5 4 Drawing upon models of policing used in other countries, the
report enumerates a checklist of "core principles" for "good implementation and functioning"
of a police system in a newly democratized - or post-war - nation.' 5 While the political,
religious, and economic backdrops in Nepal and C6te d'Ivoire differ markedly, the checklist
provides a useful framework for establishing - or rebuilding - a police system.

146

Saunders, supra note 104 at 8; Ivory Coast Overview, supra note 82.

147 Cook,supra note 10 at 7; US. Relations with Cdte dIvoire, supra note 15.
148

Cook, supra note 10 at 7; US. Relations with C6te d7voire, supra note 15; JICA'S

WORLD,

supra note 11, at

9.
149 JICA'S WORLD, supra note I1, at 9.
1so Id.
151 See Roch6, supra note 20, at 29 (The temporary utilization of a national army or police force to restore

order after a domestic crisis is not atypical but should be reserved for "extraordinary circumstances.").
152 Id.;

See

also

Sabine

Wenz,

Police

Programme

Africa

-

Cdte

d Ivoire,

GIZ

GMNH,

https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/19314.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2015) ("The capacity of the Ivorian security
forces remains limited and people's trust in the police has declined.").
153 While checklists invoke images of rudimentary
clerical tasks, their importance should not be
underestimated. In The Checklist Manifesto: How to Get Things Right, Dr. Atul Gawande argues that checklists

improve performance and reduce the likelihood of catastrophic error in such complex arenas as medicine and
airline travel. ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: How TO GET THINGS RIGHT (2011). Gawande
cautions, "[W]e believe our jobs are too complicated to reduce to a checklist." Id. at 35. For instance, in

medicine, "mapping out the proper steps for every [diagnosis] is not possible." Id. Nevertheless, a simple
checklist - in the case of medicine, measuring blood pressure, pulse rate, body temperature and respiratory rate
- sets out the "minimum necessary steps" for sophisticated endeavors and "makes them explicit." Id. at 36. As

Gawande writes, "[checklists] not only offer the possibility of verification but also instill a kind of discipline of
higher performance." Id.
15 Roch6, supra note 20, at 1.
ss Id. at v, 2.
156 Id. at 1 (noting that at the time of the report's publication, Nepal was "in the process of drafting a new

composition."); BOEX, KIMBLE & PIGEY, supra note 131, at I (explaining that while "there is no one-size-fitsall solution when it comes to the role of local governments in failed states and (post-)conflict environments,"
there are traits common to successful decentralization efforts.).
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-

The report examines models of law enforcement in countries with varying degrees
of decentralized law enforcement, ranging from the United States ("very high") and
Switzerland ("high") to India ("low") and Spain ("very low"). ' Despite widely disparate law
enforcement models in the profiled countries, the report identifies shared principles essential
to the process of decentralization.
Based on these principles, the report offers a "decentralization checklist" comprised
of four questions:
1. What is the desired distribution of police competences (or "public
authority over the police force") to different levels of governments?
2. What are the powers given by law to a police force?
3. How centralized should the organization of daily police forces be?
4. If opting for local control, should there be a national police law, national
recruiting procedure and training standards, a national penal and criminal
procedure code, a national information system - or some combination of
all four?'..
To effectively "institutionalize or upgrade a police system," a central government must
answer all four questions. 59
In the United States, for instance, the "balance of competence is clearly favorable"
to the local level.' 6 0 Secondly, local law enforcement agencies have broad autonomy and
power to enforce the laws within their respective jurisdictions. 161 This power extends to
internal departmental functions; each agency has its own procedures, rules and disciplinary
system. 162 While federal agencies - such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
routinely work in tandem with local law enforcement to investigate interstate crimes, there is
no "definition of a federal police peace officer" as such.' 6 3 Thirdly, as stated above, law
enforcement in the U.S. is extraordinarily decentralized.164 Approximately eighty percent of
law enforcement personnel work at the local level. 1ss The United States does not have a
national police law, uniform recruiting or training protocols, or a national information

15

Roch6, supra note 20, at 18.

' Id. at vi-vii, 49-51.
159 Id. at vi, 2 ("Based on this checklist [,] decisions can be made in a systematic and organized manner
on the
constitutional requirements for establishing a legal basis for and the organization of a police system .... ).
`6o Id. at 26-27 ("The maintenance of peace, conduct of orderly elections, and prosecution of unlawful actions
are all state responsibilities, pursuant to the states' primary job of exercising police power and maintaining law
and order.").
161 Id. at 35 ("[N]o police agency can give instructions to another police agency"); see also United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (In "criminal law enforcement, States historically have been sovereign.").
162 Roche, supra note 20, at 42.
161 Id. at 28, 40. The Commerce Clause vests authority in federal law enforcement agencies to participate in the
investigation of crimes affecting interstate commerce. Id. at 28.
164 Roch6, supra note 20, at 34. Switzerland utilizes a model comparable to the U.S. There, competences are

divided using the so-called "principle of subsidiary," i.e., all authority not explicitly assigned to the federal
level belongs to the local level. Id. at 25. Like the U.S., the Swiss balance of authority favors the local level
police system is "extremely fragmented." Id. at 27. No uniformed police serve at the federal level and "public
order and investigation of crimes" is a largely local undertaking. Id. at 27. The central government, however,
retains exclusive authority over a small number of crimes. Id. at 28.
165 Id. at 35.

29

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

'

system.66 Finally, though a federal criminal code applies nation-wide, all fifty states have a
system of criminal laws which, in some cases, clash with federal statutes. 167
By contrast, law enforcement in Spain is tightly centralized. Police competences and
Moreover,
delegation of power are both "exclusive" duties of the federal government.
"forces are mainly affiliated to the central level."I 6 9 Two national police forces - accounting
for 90% of all police personnel - are nationally recruited, trained, appointed and managed. "0
Additionally, the country has a single penal code and code of criminal procedure.' 7
India offers an interesting intermediate example of decentralized law
enforcement.172 There, state authority to create and maintain police forces is tempered with
"considerable uniformity in structure and functioning" under federal law. 1 Each of the 28
Indian states and 7 union territories has autonomy to establish rules relating to the police force
and its functioning. 174 Additionally, state police have considerable discretion to enforce the
law.
Yet the central government retains ability to take control over police powers "in case
of a crisis."' 7 6 The "quasi-federal" relationship is also reflected in the central government's
"coordinating and counseling role" in police matters and authority to "set up certain central
police organizations."1 7 7 India employs a mid-line approach to decentralization, that is, the
majority of law enforcement functions are at the state level.' Every state police force is
divided into two groups: "armed police," who deal with "emergency law and order
situations," and "civil police," who handle all other matters."9 The civil police comprise
roughly three-quarters of the total force.1so Moreover, the Indian Penal and Criminal
Procedure Codes are utilized by every state in like fashion.
Lastly, despite the

'6 While the U.S. does not have a "national information system" for law enforcement, the federal government
has attempted to bolster interagency communication and create national databanks in certain areas, including
sex offender registration and national security. See, e.g., Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/sex-offender-registration-and-notification-act-soma

(last

updated June

3,

2015);

Law

Enforcement

Information

Sharing,

INFO.

SHARING

ENV'T,

http://www.ise.gov/mission-and-vision.
167 Roch6, supra note 20, at 40. Importantly, where federal and state law overlap or conflict (or when state high
courts disagree with the U.S. Supreme Court), federal law and Supreme Court decisions predominate. Id.
168 Roch6, supra note 20, at 26.
169 Id. at 28.
170 Id. at 34.

Id. at 40.
172 Id. at 41.
''

"7 Id. at 39.
174 Id. at 26. Although Indian law enforcement works predominantly at the state level, India has local levels of
government and power is devolved by states in accordance with the Constitution. SAUNDERS, supra note 105 at

21-22.
's

Roch6, supra note 20, at 26.

176 Id.

"7 Id.; Saunders, supra note 103, at 22 ("There are some other limitations on the autonomy of the Indian states.

.. which make India ...

somewhat centralized.. . ." "In particular, the Governor of each state is appointment by

the President of India, and the center may intervened in state affairs in a range of emergency-type situations.").
178 Roch6, supra note 20, at 37. As a point of comparison, only ten-percent of law enforcement
personnel in the

U.S. work at the state level. Id. at 35.
1' Id. at 37.
1is

Id.

is'

Id. at 40.
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concentration of law enforcement at the state level, recruitment, training and appointments are
operated by central government. 182
3. C6te d'Ivoire's History of Centralized Law Enforcement
Even before the military's assumption of policing duties, C6te d'Ivoire employed a
The Ivorian system follows the French
heavily centralized law enforcement system.
colonial model in which three central ministries - the Ministry of Internal Security, the
Ministry of Defense and Maritime Affairs, and the Ministry of Interior- share responsibility
for policing.184 Under the country's 2000 Constitution, the National Assembly "votes the law"
and establishes the rules with respect to the national police force.' 85 The Ministry of Internal
Security is charged with state security and national police functions. 186 In addition, a
Gendarmerie operated through the Ministry of Defense is responsible for general law
enforcement, internal security and maintenance of public order. 187 After the 2002 rebellion
that split the country, the Gendarmerie was fully integrated into the more-than-30,000 man
Ivorian Defense and Security Forces (FDS) which includes the army, navy and other military
branches.
Presently, the unit comprises more than one-third of the FDS and is commanded
by a major general. 189 Finally, local police are controlled through the Ministry of Interior.' 90
In keeping with the centralized model, C6te d'lvoire uses a single national penal code and
code of penal procedure.191
Historically, police recruiting and training have been conducted through the central
government.192 Fifteen years of civil unrest has contributed to a sharp decline in the quality of
training, preparation and equipment for Ivorian police. '9 Notably, the government's
insufficient investment is glaring in the area of "crime fighting" on the local level.194
Equipment-wise, many police departments lack appropriate documentation systems, basic
technology for crime scene investigation, and other essential tools.' 9 Moreover, training
deficiencies are heightened due to the integration of "a large number of untrained rebels" into

182 Id. at 41.
o ROBERT WINsLOW, PH.D, CRIME AND SOCIETY: A COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY TOUR OF THE WORLD,

http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/africa/cote divoire.html; LARRY E. SULLIVAN ET AL.,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 1028, (2004).
184 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 183, at 1028-29.
185 COTE D'IVOIRE CONST., Title V, Art. 71; SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 183, at 1028 (noting that the C6te
d'lvoire Constitution was revised in 2004 but suspended after the war.).
"' WINSLOW, supra note 183.
1 Id.;
Cdte
D'Ivoire

Profile,

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

STATE,

http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/cotedivoire/123201.htm.
88 Cdte D 'Ivoire Profile, supra note 187.
189 Id.
1o Id.

'9' Kouable Clarisse Gueu, The Legal System in C6e D Ivoire: Where Do We Stand?, GLOBALEX ¶ 5.1 (2009),
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Cote_dlvoire.htm#_5._Sources-of ("Within its national jurisdiction
C6te d'Ivoire has a Constitution, laws, and rules.").
192 WINSLOW, supra note 183.
1'

Wenz, supra note 152.

194

Id.

[9

Id.
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the police force.196 On a more positive note, C6te d'lvoire's internal security sector has been
"progressing steadily" since 2011, albeit at a rate slower than its economic growth.' 97 The
country also enjoys international support - much of which has yielded funding for new
computers, evidence collection kits, and structural upgrades. 198
Futhermore, the post-war era presents a chance for the Ivorian government to
rethink its highly centralized law enforcement model and consider more effective alternatives
for delegation of police authority and powers, officer recruitment and training, and
departmental practices. These questions, however, are best answered as part of a broader
discussion about the crime control strategies that will best address the country's particular
needs.
II. COMMUNITY POLICING AS A BEST PRACTICE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
1. The U.S. War on Drugs and the Era of Mass Incarceration
The Ivorian delegation's central inquiry involved the "best practices" in the United
States for effective law enforcement and crime control, especially at the local level. In reality,
the criminal justice strategies employed in the U.S. over the last four decades are far removed
from theoretical "best practices." While crime rates have dipped in many cities, the economic
cost and human toll of the "vast, costly social experiment" to clamp down on offenders is

significant.

199

Nearly 2.2 million Americans, a disproportionate share who are minorities, are
currently incarcerated. 20 0 Most never received a trial, choosing to plead guilty rather than risk
a substantially lengthier period of incarceration if convicted by a jury. 20 Further, the number

196

197

Id.
Id.

198 Many of the improvements to police departments have taken place in Abidjan. Though the economic hub
was hard-hit during the civil war, outlying localities in the country also require substantial assistance. Id.

9 ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & STEVEN RAPHAEL, THE BROOKING INST., METRO. POLICY PROGRAM: CITY AND
SUBURBAN
CRIME
TRENDS
IN
METROPOLITAN
AMERICA
1
(2011),

http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2011/5/26-metropolitan-crime-kneeboneraphael/0526 metropolitan_crimekneebone raphael.pdf (reporting that both violent and property crime rates

dropped by almost 30 percent in the 100 largest U.S. metropolitan areas between 1990 and 2008.); OLIVER
ROEDER, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & JULIA BOWLING, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y. U. SCH. OF LAW,
WHAT
CAUSED
THE
CRIME
DECLINE
IN
CRIME?
3
(2012),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/WhatCaused_The_CrimeDecline.pdf
(Though

crime rates have fallen since 1991, the United States "has incarcerated a higher percentage of its people, and for
a longer period, than any other democracy.").
200 Bill Keller, Prison Revolt. A former law-and-order conservative takes a lead on criminal-justice reform,
THE NEW YORKER, 22-23 (June 29, 2015) ("African-Americans are nearly six times as likely as whites to be
incarcerated, and Latinos are more than twice as likely.")

In 2011, 101,149 defendants were charged in U.S. federal courts. Almost 90,000 defendants - about 90percent of those charged - entered pleas of guilty. Strikingly, only 274 defendants - less than one percent
-

2'

were acquitted

after a jury trial. See Judicial Facts and Figures, U.S.

COURTS (Sept.

20, 2011),

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/20 I 1/Table505.pdf. In many states, the
percentages of criminal defendants who plead guilty approximate federal totals. For example, in Illinois,
between 2000-2010, the Illinois Sentencing Policy Advisory Council reported that "trials accounted for less
than 5% of felony convictions in eighty-two of Illinois' 102 counties; looked at the other way, guilty pleas
accounted for 95% or more of felony convictions in eighty-two of Illinois' 102 counties." ILL. SENTENCING
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of criminal defendants subject to federal prosecution nearly doubled, from 54,980 in 1995 to
202
101,049 in 2011, in twenty years..
State prosecutions sharply increased during the same
period.203 Though the United States contains less than five-percent of the world's population,
it claims one-quarter of the worldwide prison population.2
The spike in prosecutions is mainly attributable to the so-called War on Drugs, an
amalgam of punitive urban crime control tactics that began in the mid-I 980s. 205 A decrease in
crime into the early-1990s emboldened lawmakers to pass the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994.206 In many ways, the law represents the apex of the "tough on
crime" era. 2 07 By any measure, it remains the most expansive crime bill in the history of the
United States. 2 0 8 The law provided billons of discretionary dollars to local law
209
increased funding for prison construction, 2 10 and enhanced penalties for
enforcement,
1
various drug-related offenses. 2 1
In the early 2000s, the George W. Bush administration capitalized on continued
public support for aggressive law enforcement.212 In 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft
issued a directive to federal prosecutors to "charge and pursue the offense or offenses that
generate the most substantial sentence" and to "vigorously oppose" any proposed sentencing
reductions.213 At the same time, the Bush administration continued to pour funding into state
and local law enforcement to hire more police officers, especially in urban areas.24 The
Department of Justice steadily increased federal prosecutions of street-level drug and firearm
possession crimes. 2 15 These policies achieved "truly staggering rates of incarceration" in the

POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL, RESEARCH BRIEFING UPDATE: ILLINOIS FELONY SENTENCING - A
RETROSPECTIVE
4 (2011), http://www.icjia.state.il.us/spac/pdf/A%20Retrospective.%2March2O12.pdf
[hereinafter ILLINOIS FELONY SENTENCING]
202 U.S.
COURTS,
JUDICIAL
FACTS
AND
FIGURES
(2011),

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/201 I/Table5O5.pdf.
203 See, e.g., ILLINOIS FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 202.

204 Keller, supra note 201.
20s Claire
Suddath,

The
War
on
Drugs,
TIME.COM
(Mar.
25,
2009),
A strong statistical correlation exists
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887488,00.html.
between the advent of the War on Drugs and the decline in criminal jury trials. Specifically, in 1980, the rate of
federal cases proceeding to trial was five times higher than it was thirty years later. HINDALANG CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESEARCH CTR. & UNIV. OF ALBANY, SOURCEBOOK of CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH STATISTICS

ONLINE tbl.5.22 (Kathleen Maguireed., 2010), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebooklpdf/t52220 I 0.pdf.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994),
reprinted in I BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW
206

ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994, at v (1997) [hereinafter Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of

1994].
207 KNEEBONE & RAPHAEL, supra note 199.
208

Id.

209 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, supra note 206.
210 id.
211

id.
212 ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY 1 (2014).
213 Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors

(Sept. 22, 2003),

http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm.
214 GOFFMAN, supra note 212, at I (citing JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 241(2007)).
215 Id. at 2.
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-

United States. 216 Today, one in 100 adults in the United States is incarcerated; one in 30
217
adults is under some form of court-ordered supervision.
A direct correlation between escalated crime control policies and the drop in crime,
though, is dubious. 2 18 Various "social, economic, and environmental factors," such as an
aging population, decreased unemployment, and modest income growth have contributed to
overall crime reduction. 219 To the contrary, the salutary effect of mass incarceration on lower
crime is negligible. 220 Likewise, increased police numbers have yielded only marginal
benefits.221 Moreover, U.S. crime control methods over the last three decades are neither
economically nor sociologically sustainable.222 American taxpayers spend $260 billion per
223
year on criminal justice, with minimal enduring returns. Almost half of offenders released
from prison are re-arrested and incarcerated within three years.224 In effect, the system
recirculates the same offenders in and out of prison, to parole or other forms of supervision,
and back again.225 From a sociological perspective, the toll extracted by the War on Drugs
226
Punitive crime control and mass
especially in poorer communities - is incalculable.
incarceration has fractured families, disenfranchised millions of offenders, and created
entrenched social inequality.227

Agency Perspective: Hearing on Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2014 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, Jud. Comm. on Over-Criminalization, 113th Cong. 65 (2014) [hereinafter Patton] (statement of
David E. Patton, Exec. Dir. Federal Defenders of New York).
217 Id.
218 ROEDER, EISEN & BOWLING, supra note 199, at 25.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 7, 15. According to the report, incarceration has been declining in effectiveness as a crime
control
tactic since before 1980. Since 2000, the effect of increasing incarceration on the crime rate has been
"essentially zero." While the incarceration rate jumped by more than 60 percent from 1990 to 1999, while the
rate of violent crime dropped by 28 percent. Id.
221 Id. at 8.
222 See Suddath, supra note 205 (reporting that the Bush administration's 2002 goal of reducing all
illegal drug
use by 25% resulted in an "unprecedented number of marijuana-related arrests," while "pot use only declined
6%" and use of other drugs increased - "causing officials to play a never ending game of narcotic whack-amole.").
223 ROEDER, EISEN & BOWLING, supra note 199, at 1; Marc Santora, City 's Annual Cost Per Inmate Is
$168,000: Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/nyregion/citysannual-cost-per-inmate-is-nearly-168000-study-says.html (citing a 2010 Vera Institute study calculating an
aggregate cost of $39 billion to house inmates in the 40 states participating in the study and an average taxpayer
cost of $31,286 per inmate).
224 Keller, supra note 200, at 23; Howard Becker, in his review of ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN
AMERICAN CITY, http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/O/bol8039324.html (last visited Oct. 27,
2015) (describing the recidivism among minorities rate as "[being] trapped on the wrong side of the law with
no way out - the situation of so many young Black Americans today.").
225 GOFFMAN, supra note 212, at 17-18. Goffinan details the plights of several young black men who personify
this cycle, including "Mike" who, in the span of five years, spent three and a half years in jail or prison and
"out of the 139 weeks he was not incarcerated, he spent 87 weeks on probation or parole for five overlapping
sentences. Id. He spent 35 weeks with a warrant out for his arrest, and had a total of ten warrants issued on him.
He also had at least 51 court appearance over the five-year period[.]". Id.
226 Id. at 3 ("Since the 1980s, the War on Crime and War on Drugs have taken millions of Black young men
out of school, work, and family life, sent them to jails and prisons, and returned them to society with felony
convictions.")
216

227

Id.
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Presently, a marked philosophical shift away from costly and punishment-focused
crime control, especially among conservatives, has taken hold. Since the genesis of the mass
on the
have centered
incarceration movement, progressive counter-arguments
2 28
A
disproportionate focus and deleterious effects on low-income urban neighborhoods.
growing chorus on the Right has now joined the movement towards sensible reforms to the
criminal justice system. 2 29 The impetus for change varies in Republican circles with
budgetary concerns, interests in personal liberty, and consideration of the "moral and spiritual
dimensions" of mass incarceration all cited as bases for reform. 2 3 0 Regardless of its primary
motivation, the turnabout has generated bipartisan support for a new approach.
2. The Reemergence of Community Policing as an Alternative to the War on Drugs
Since the inception of the War on Drugs, the federal government has distributed
231
Presently, the Department of Justice provides between
block grants to police departments.
$300 and $500 million annually to state and local law enforcement agencies.232 Spending by
police departments is discretionary, and used on "everything from military grade hardware to
officer overtime." 2 3 3 To the extent that the grants measure outcomes, metrics for success are
largely quantitative and based on arrest, conviction, and incarceration numbers.23 4 Moreover,

228 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS

(2010). Alexander writes that crime control practices over the last 30 years created a "racial caste system" in
which "it is perfectly legal to discriminate against criminals in nearly all the ways that it was once legal to
discriminate against African Americans, [including] employment discrimination, housing discrimination, denial
of the right to vote, denial of educational opportunity, denial of food stamps and other public benefits, and
exclusion from jury service[.]". Id.
229 Keller, supra note 200, at 23; Patton,supra note 216 at 1.
230 Patton, supra note 216, at I ("Conservatives denounce the unnecessary and unwise fiscal costs, the
assault on personal liberty, and the harshness of a system that has become unmoored from foundational
religious principles such as redemption and mercy."); see also Keller, supra note 201, at 25. Patrick J. Nolan,
a former Republican congressman who served 25-months in prison for a racketeering conviction, describes cost

containment as "ancillary" and "human dignity" as the driving force for change. Id. at 25. Nolan, by his
account, became disillusioned with the lack of emphasis on inmate education, job training, and other
rehabilitative efforts ("The implication is: you're worthless, you come from nothing, you are nothing, you'll

never be anything") and the corresponding high rate of recidivism ("[W]hen prisoners were released, the guards
would say, 'See you in a few months."') Id.
FORTIER & CHETTIAR, supra note 28, at 3 ("Today, a complex web of federal crime-fighting grants funnels
billions of dollars across the country each year. Many of these programs were created during the height of the
2'

War on Drugs.").
232 The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) administered by the Department of Justice
provides the principal source of funding for law enforcement. Id. at 3.
233

Radley

Balko,

The

Drug

War's

Profit

Motive,

WASH.

POST,

(Feb.

17,

2014),

also
see
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/02/17/the-drug-wars-profit-motive/;
Simmons, supra note 24, at 381 (discussing provisions of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
that enable the Attorney General to make grants to local law enforcement that "may be used for numerous
purposes.").
234 FORTIER & CHETTIAR, supra note 28, at I (discussing grant metrics that "encourage[d] states to increase
arrests, prosecutions, and incarceration, all in the belief that harsher punishment would better control crime");

Michelle

Alexander,

Why

Police

Lie

Under

Oath,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Feb.

2,

2013),

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/why-police-officers-lie-under-oath.html ("In the War on
Drugs, federal grant programs like the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program have
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in the War on Drugs era, the Department of Defense has given an additional $4 billion in
surplus military equipment to local police departments. 2 35 The program has transformed
police forces into domestic armies, with departments securing missiles and armored personnel
vehicles.2 36 Like other federal grants, the giveaways come with "few strings attached" and are
rarely need-based.237
Amidst shifting views about effective crime control, there is little debate over the
amount of federal dollars given to law enforcement agencies.2 38 Rather, the salient question
asks how to redirect those dollars from practices that tear away at communities and contribute
to high incarceration rates toward ones that incentivize sustainable public policy goals."23 9
One popular approach involves tying federal grants to policies and programs that promote
community-based policing strategies.24 Generally speaking, community policing embodies
24!
the ideal that police can rarely solve public safety problems alone. Consequently, the model
encourages partnerships with community leaders, local politicians, school teachers, and the
242
These partnerships are designed to develop solutions through collaboration
public at large.
243
and trust-building.
To this end, police are seen less as armed adversaries and, to a greater

encouraged state and local law enforcement agencies to boost drug arrests in order to compete for millions of
dollars in funding. Law enforcement has increasingly become a numbers game.").
235 Hank Johnson, The Failed "War on Drugs" is MilitarizingLaw Enforcement, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 24,

2014, 2:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-hank-johnson/the-failed-war-on-drugs-ib_6043558.htmi.
236 Radley Balko, Congratulations!Your Tiny Town Has an MRAP and is Ready for War, WASH. POST (Apr.
28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/04/18/congratulations-your-tiny-townhas-an-mrap-and-is-ready-for-war/ (reporting that towns with modest crime rates and populations under 15,000
have received MRAPs and other military-grade equipment).
237 THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Little Restraint in Military Giveaways, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (July 31, 2013, 7:32

PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/stoty/story.php?storyld=207340981 (reporting that an Associated Press
investigation shows unfettered access to government military equipment by local police departments has led to
a "belly-up-to-the-open-bar mentality.").
238 FORTIER & CHETTIAR, supra note 28, at I ("The question is not whether police should have more money or
less money, but rather what they do with that money.").
239 FORTHER & CHETTIAR, supra note 28, at 5. A critical related issue is whether receipt of federal grants

should hinge on police accountability. In her fascinating recent article, Professor Kami Chavis Simmons argues
that, to receive grants, state and local police departments should be required to "implement mechanisms to

monitor and track complaints against officers, develop and implement citizen complaint procedures, or
implement policies related to the investigation of uses of force." Simmons, supra note 25, at 390-91.
240 FORTIER & CHETrIAR, supra note 28, at 2 ("Law enforcement grants should be tied to specific goals that ...
keep communities safe - without encouraging unnecessary arrests or force."); Radley Balko, Rise of the

Warrior
Cop, .
WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBl0001424127887323848804578608040780519904

7,
2013),
(hereinafter Rise of the

Warrior Cop] ("Many longtime and retired law-enforcement officers . . . worry that the trend toward
militarization is too far gone. Those who think there is still a chance at reform tend to embrace the idea of

community policing, an approach that depends more on civil society than brute force."); Radley Balko, After
Ferguson,
How
Should
Police
Respond
to
Protests?
(August
14,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/08/14/after-ferguson-how-should-police-respondto-protests/ [hereinafter After Ferguson, How Should Police Respond to Protests?] (Several law enforcement
officers surveyed believe that responses to civilian protests that emphasize "proximity," "personalization," and
"interaction over reaction," are superior to those involving direct confrontation.).
241 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERV. (COPS), COMMUNITY

POLICING DEFINED (March 2014), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/vets-to-cops/e030917193-CP-Defined.pdf
[hereinafter COPS].
242 Id.
243

id.
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degree, allies in crime prevention and problem solving.244 As author and criminologist Radley
Balko writes, community policing
is "all about a baton-twirling 'Officer Friendly' rather than
245
a Taser-toting RoboCop."
Community policing strategies are not new. 24 6 The Community Oriented Policing
Statute (COPS) was an "important feature" of the Violent Crime Control and Law
247
Enforcement Act of 1994.
As part of COPS, the Department of Justice created an office to
oversee the hiring of 100,000 new community-policing officers, help police departments build
community policing infrastructure, and promote community policing techniques throughout
the country.248 Though the DOJ reached its hiring benchmark, reactive "arrest first" police
practices remained the norm.249 In 2010, as momentum for crime control reform gained
steam, the White House issued its first clear repudiation of arrest-driven policing when Gil
Kerlikowske, the nation's "drug czar," admitted, "We can't arrest our way out of the drug
problem." 25 0
Now, in the wake of recent clashes between police and civilians in Ferguson,
Baltimore, and other U.S. cities, community-based law enforcement strategies are trending
anew.251 In a May 2015 speech in Camden, New Jersey, President Obama heralded the city as
a "new model of community policing" in recognition of its successful crime-reduction
efforts. 25 2 The President commended officers who "[got] to know the residents" rather than

Id.; Matthew Harwood, How Did America's Police Get So Militarized?, MOTHER JONEs
(Aug. 14, 2014,
3:09
PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/america-police-military-swat-ferguson-westcotttampa ("If community policing rests on mutual trust between the police and people, militarized policing

244

operates on the assumption of 'officer safety' at all costs and contempt for anyone who sees things differently.
The result is an 'us versus them' mentality.").
245 Rise ofthe Warrior Cop, supra note 240.
246 After Ferguson, How Should Police Respond to Protests?, supra note 241 ("One of the pioneers of

community policing is Jerry Wilson, who was appointed police chief for Washington, D.C. in 1969."); Meares,
supra note 29, at 1596 ("Since the late sixties, involving communities in policing has become a priority, as
documents like the 1967 President's Commission on Crime attest.").
247 Simmons, supra note 24, at 381; Barry Goetz, Ph.D., Community Policing: An Alternative Drug Strategy?,
NAT'L DRUG STRATEGY NETWORK (Jan. 1995), http://ndsn.org/jan95/guest.html.
248 Meares, supra note 29, at 1596.
249 Id. at 1598 (citing research reporting "wide variations in the extent to which policing
organizations
participate in collaborative opportunities for police and citizens."); Bonnie Bucqueroux, 11 Reasons
Community Policing Died, LANSING ONLINE NEWS (Dec. 7, 2014), http://lansingonlinenews.com/news/llreasons-community-policing-died/. Bucqueroux, a co-author of the 1990 study, COMMUNITY POLICING: A
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, cites the War on Drugs as a key reason for the failure of COPS to take hold. Id.
Bucqueroux discusses her experience as a member of a training team organized by the Community Policing
Consortium. The Department of Justice, she says, rejected her team's proposal to refocus policing in public
housing developments on collaborative solutions to crime in favor of an arrest-based approach. Id.
250 Drug Control Policy Director Talks Prevention, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (July
16,
2010),

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?stoyld= 128567349.
251 President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Salvation Army Ray and Joan Krock Corps Community Center,
(May
18,
2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressOFFICE
OF
THE
PRESS
SEC'Y

office/2015/05/18/remarks-president-community-policing

[hereinafter Remarks by the President]. See also

EOA Staff, County Police, Officials Participatingin White House Programson Community Policing, EYE ON

ANNAPOLIS (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.eyeonannapolis.net/2015/08/03/county-police-officials-participate-inwhite-house-program-on-community-policing/ (reporting on national and local White House forums with
police departments as part of a "national conversation" on community policing.).
252 Remarks by the President, supra note 25 1.
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just "walking the beat."25 He also touted the administration's "new policies" to regulate
military-style equipment, which "can alienate and intimidate local residents, and send the
wrong message." 2 54 Finally, he cited "concrete proposals" of a national task force on
community policing aimed at "building trust between law enforcement and the communities
25 5
they serve while enhancing public safety."
Though community policing's central aim is developing positive relationships
between law enforcement and residents, its success requires more than a mere shift in
attitudes and interactions between police and the communities they serve. 256 At a minimum,
community policing requires thoughtful organization of police departments. "The
'community' for which a patrol officer is given responsibility should be a small, well-defined
geographical area." 25 7 In turn, "beat" boundaries correspond to neighborhood or other local
government divisions to preserve "the unique geographical and social characteristics" of
communities. 2 58 Officers remain in a single location or neighborhood over long-term
259
Ideally, these assignments help forge strong working relationships between
assignments.
officers and residents, promoting mutual accountability.260
From an institutional standpoint, effective community policing also requires
implementation of clear, comprehensive and current departmental protocols - especially for
searches, custodial interrogations, use of force and other invasive measures.21 At the same
time, departments must institute comparably detailed standards to review alleged violations of
262
To enhance "external legitimacy," soliciting public input in the creation of
such protocols.
the policies is essential.26 3 Once finished, the policies and procedures must be available for
public inspection.264
Moreover, community policing demands progressive officer recruitment, hiring, and
training methods.265 Recruitment and hiring practices should emphasize race, gender, and
socio-economic diversity and aim to create police departments that reflect community
demographics.266 By the same token, employment descriptions, applications, and interviews
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255 Remarks by the President, supra note 251; see also Fact Sheet: Creating Opportunity for All Through
Stronger, Safer Communities, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y (May 18, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2015/05/18/fact-sheet-creating-opportunity-all-through-stronger-safer-communities.
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must incorporate core community policing principles.267 As officers move through the ranks,
performance evaluations and promotion criteria should remain closely linked to problemsolving skills and relationship building. 26 Finally, as community policing prizes versatility
or despecialization- training must encompass a multitude of abilities and attributes. 26 9
At bottom, the long-term prospects for community policing - like any other crime
reduction strategy - hinge on increasing public safety. 2 7 0 As President Obama acknowledged,
the early returns in Camden and other high-crime cites warrant cautious optimism. 2 7 1 To build
upon successful practices, the President's task force recommends that the Department of
Justice identify "replicable factors that could be used to guide law enforcement agencies in
other communities." 27 2 In fact, the community policing strategies that have lowered crime
domestically also hold promise in C6te d'Ivoire.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR DECENTRALIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COTE
D'IVOIRE
Since the civil war, C6te d'Ivoire has managed considerable progress in combating
crime.273 The U.N. and European Union currently supply troops to assist with issues of
national security. 2 7 4 Nonetheless, crime rates remain critically high. 2 7 5 A significant
percentage of offenses are "crimes of opportunity," including robberies, car thefts, and home
invasions.276 With rare exception, law enforcement is ill-equipped and poorly trained to deal
with such street-level crime.277 Much like the chasm between the country's ongoing economic
recovery and its continued high poverty indicators, the security improvements at the national
level have not translated to local gains. 278
To confront its most pressing crime problems, C6te d'lvoire is well-positioned to
implement a partially decentralized law enforcement system with an emphasis on community
policing. First, since the civil war, the central government has stabilized and initiated "calm
279
dialogue" with its political opposition.27 In addition, the robust economy, improved business
climate, and plentiful foreign funding provide a spending platform for "national cohesion

267 COPS, supra note 241, at 7 ("The principles of community policing need to be infused throughout
the entire
personal system of an agency, including recruitment, hiring selection, and retention of all law enforcement
agency staff. . .").
266 COPS, supra note 241 ("Personal evaluations, supervision, and training must also be aligned with the

agencies' community policing views.").
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270 BUREAU OF JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 257, at 13 ("The goal of community policing is to reduce
crime and disorder. . .").
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273 2015 CRIME AND SAFETY REPORT, supra note 95.
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efforts," like improving education, bolstering law enforcement. 280 Also, the April 2013
elections established a basic, if imperfect, framework for regional and local governance.2 8
Finally, the U.N. and its member nations have pledged support to the Ivorian government to
212
These factors, in totality, provide C6te d'lvoire
assist in continuing security improvements.
a foundation to reshape its system of law enforcement to more effectively respond to local
needs.
How should a new system look? C6te d'lvoire's adoption of a highly decentralized
model, like the U.S. system of law enforcement, is infeasible. The Ivorian national police and
Gendarmerie are clustered tightly around the national government, with both authority and
police power vested in three central ministries. Full decentralization, whether to the regional
or local level, would necessitate a massive paradigm shift. Additionally, despite the progress
made in rebuilding, local police departments still lack the capacity and resources to handle
recruitment, training, and management of officers without national assistance. Lastly, in light
of C6te d'lvoire's deep religious and ethnic differences and still-percolating political tension,
a clean break from the central government risks setting the country on a slippery slope
towards renewed chaos or even dissolution.
A partially decentralized law enforcement model presents a better option. Under this
system, the Ivorian government would delegate limited and uniform power to local police
departments. In addition, the administration - via the Ministry of Defense - would
promulgate guidelines to promote officer accountability, including use-of-force standards and
disciplinary protocols. Funding would stream from the central government, but local police
departments would control month-to-month spending decisions and resource allocation. Local
departments would have additional opportunities for self-governance, including office
management, interpretation and enforcement of internal policies, and decisions related to
officer hiring, promotions or dismissals. Though the country's single penal code would
remain "the law of the land," local officers would have discretion with respect to arrests,
charge-selection, and other aspects of enforcement. Officer recruitment would take place at
the local level, but training would be conducted through the central government.
A system of shared policing duties and responsibilities will not require a radical
transformation of C6te d'Ivoire's current law enforcement structure. More critically, the
proposed divisions will vastly improve the existing model. For instance, centralized training
will enable law enforcement to take advantage of expertise at the national level and create a
structured program for new candidates. At the same time, local officer recruitment will
increase the likelihood that police departments are demographically representative of the
communities served. Plus, partial decentralization mitigates risks that distribution of power
may allow certain regions or religious factions to ignore national mandates. Further, such a
system will allow the central administration to offer additional assistance and manpower to
poorer or higher-crime regions unable to serve their residents. Most important, delegating a
measure of authority to the local level will improve policing efficiency and effectiveness,
boosting public confidence in the process.
In additional to the proposed structural changes to its law enforcement model, C6te
283
d'Ivoire must shore up deficiencies in officer training and organization.
Here, integration of

280

Id.

281

A.R., supra note 89.
S.C. Res. 2226, supra note 9.

282

283 2015 CRIME AND SAFETY REPORT, supra note 95, at 7 ("Police need significant training.").

40

THINKING GLOBALLY, POLICING LOCALLY

a comprehensive training program centered on community policing strategies will
complement the restructured system and address multiple needs. In many ways, community
policing represents decentralization at its most local. Law enforcement officers work with
residents to formulate solutions to local problems and, in doing so, construct a network of
safer neighborhoods. From a pure crime-fighting perspective, this strategy is a logical fit for
C6te d'lvoire. Most notably, training officers to patrol a specific "beat," initiate constructive
dialogue with community leaders, and maintain a conspicuous presence will help combat the
country's high volume of street-level crime. In the same vein, community-based policing
assignments will create an interconnected law enforcement presence throughout the country.
In contrast to monocentric, top-down systems, evened officer distribution will improve
response time and coordination of emergency services, especially in rural and underserved
areas.
In addition, use of community policing techniques will facilitate organizational
transparency and, in so doing, help restore diminished public trust in government. Moreover,
collaborative policing practices will empower residents to become involved as "stakeholders"
in the growth, progress and security of their communities. By inviting the participation of
residents in cities and towns throughout the country, community policing will advance the
U.N.'s goal of achieving "national reconciliation and social cohesion." 2 8 4 As a related benefit,
such strategies will also enliven the U.N. mandate to involve ethnic and religious minorities
2 85
and women "in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security."
[V. CONCLUSION
The Ivorian officials with whom I spoke in June 2015 described the country's
policing restoration efforts in terms of both challenges and opportunities. On one hand,
rebuilding damaged departments, returning power to the police, and reducing skyrocketing
crime are herculean tasks. The process, however, also presents a meaningful chance to
improve upon the law enforcement model in place prior to post-election violence.
Towards this goal, partial decentralization of the police force is sensible and
attainable. By implementing a partially decentralized system, C6te d'Ivoire will enrich the
quality of law enforcement, strengthen communities at the local level, and join a worldwide
trend towards greater decentralization of government and social services. In addition, the
country's integration of community policing practices into the revamped structure will
improve its prospects for lowering crime while cultivating public trust.
Though C6te d'Ivoire remains deeply frayed after fifteen years of political,
religious, and social unrest, the two complementary strategies will help restore its oncevibrant national fabric community by community.
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